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Francesco Pucci was a Florentine heretic who was executed by the Catholic 
Church in 1597. Since the 1930s, he has been considered by Italian historians to 
be an important contributor to the development of theories of religious tolera-
tion. A close analysis of two texts written by Pucci reveals that his thought was 
more complex than previously supposed. In a letter to Niccolò Balbani, a Cal-
vinist minister in Geneva, Pucci described his heterodox theology. hese views 
led him to develop a deeply intolerant vision of concord. hese theological com-
mitments structured Pucci’s thinking in this period, and they are relected in 
his Forma di una republica catholica. he text describes a secret society, which 
would allow those who followed Pucci’s heterodox beliefs to live freely. he 
society was conceived as a temporary expedient. Although it contains some tol-
erant elements, it was designed as a means to secure Pucci’s intolerant vision 
of concord.
The son of a Florentine merchant, Francesco Pucci (1543– 97) spent 
much of his adult life travelling across Europe developing and espousing idio-
syncratic theological beliefs, best— albeit broadly— categorized as “Pelagian.”1 
Little known during his lifetime, Pucci remains a relatively obscure igure today. 
Had it not captured the attention of two signiicant historians of the Italian Ref-
ormation, Delio Cantimori and Luigi Firpo, his work might never have been 
explored.2 Both historians recognized Pucci as an important igure in the devel-
opment of Italian religious, intellectual, and political history. heir evaluation of 
his signiicance was framed by what I have elsewhere termed the “Italian liberal 
1For a concise overview of Pucci’s life and work, see Peter Holmes, “Pucci, Francesco (1543– 
1597),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
accessed 24 September 2013, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22859.
2See Delio Cantimori, Eretici italiani del Cinquecento (Florence: Sansoni, 1939; repr., Eretici 
italiani del Cinquecento e Prospettive di storia ereticale italiana del Cinquecento, ed. Adriano Pros-
peri [Turin: Einaudi, 1992 and 2002]); Luigi Firpo, “Processo e morte di Francesco Pucci,” Rivista 
di ilosoia 40 (1949): 371– 405; Firpo, “Francesco Pucci in Inghilterra,” Revue internationale de phi-
losophie 5 (1951): 158– 73; and Firpo, “Nouve ricerche su Francesco Pucci,” Rivista storica italiana 79 
(1967): 1053– 74. For more recent discussions of Pucci see Antonio Rotondò, “Il primo soggiorno in 
Inghilterra e i primi scritti teologici di Francesco Pucci,” in Rotondò, Studi e ricerche di storia ereti-
cale (Turin: Giappichelli, 1974), 225– 71; Élie Barnavi and Miriam Eliav- Feldon, Le périple de Fran-
cesco Pucci: Utopie, hérésie et vérité religieuse dans la renaissance tardive (Paris: Hachette, 1988); 
Mario Biagione, “Prospettive di ricerche su Francesco Pucci,” Rivista storica italiana 107 (1995): 
133– 52; and Biagione, “Incontri italo- svizzeri nell’Europa del tardo Cinquecento: Francesco Pucci 
e Samule Huber,” Rivista storica italiana 111 (1999): 364– 422. See also Giorgio Caravale, Il profeta 
disarmato: L’eresia di Francesco Pucci nell’Europa del Cinquecento (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 14– 22, 
for Caravale’s summary and critique of the historiography on Pucci.
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historiographical tradition.” According to this interpretation of history, indi-
viduals such as Pucci drew upon the distinctive intellectual and spiritual inheri-
tance of the Italian Renaissance to produce rational ideas that would form the 
basis of an indigenous movement for religious reform. In turn, this movement 
allowed for the development of doctrines such as religious toleration that would 
characterize the Enlightenment.3
he Italian liberal tradition is frequently overlooked in Anglophone reviews 
of the literature on toleration, marginalizing some of its most important insights. 
For instance, it is rarely acknowledged that by focusing on Renaissance Italians’ 
contribution to the development of ideas such as toleration, proponents of the lib-
eral tradition challenged the centrality assigned to Protestantism in existing nar-
ratives of Enlightenment before Joseph Lecler’s Histoire de la tolérance au siècle de 
la Réforme (1955). Nevertheless, this approach encouraged historians of the lib-
eral tradition to reconstruct— sometimes in misleading ways— the thought of the 
individuals they studied in order to it them into their predetermined narrative.4 
For their part, Italian historians have not tended to engage with English language 
historiographical developments. From as early as the 1930s, Anglophone histo-
rians have questioned narratives of an inexorable development of liberalism and 
attendant growth of modern concepts of toleration. hese critiques have gathered 
in number, and over the last twenty years historians have revealed a rich rep-
ertoire of contemporary ideas associated with toleration and reconstructed the 
manner in which toleration was practiced in medieval and early modern Europe. 
Failure to engage fully with these insights has meant that a number of the key 
assumptions of the earlier Italian liberal tradition are still present in modern 
Italian language studies.5
In a recent work charting the origins of Pucci’s thought, Giorgio Cara-
vale explicitly reairmed the Tuscan heretic’s importance as a theorist of tol-
eration, and thus as someone who contributed to the development of European 
3Neil Tarrant, “Censoring Science in Sixteenth- Century Italy: Recent (and Not- So- Recent) 
Research,” History of Science 52, no. 1 (2014): 1– 27, esp. 4– 9.
4For a discussion of the historiographical issues involved, see the still relevant article by Quen-
tin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and heory 8, no. 1 
(1969): 3– 53.
5For critiques of Enlightenment narratives and reviews of recent developments in the histori-
ography of the idea of toleration, see, for example, Cary J. Nederman and John Christian Laursen, 
eds., Diference and Dissent: heories of Tolerance in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Lanham, 
MD: Rowan and Littleield, 1996), 1– 17; John Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman, eds., Beyond 
the Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 1– 10; Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance 
in England, 1500– 1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 1– 39, esp. 1– 13; Benjamin 
Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conlict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1– 12; and Jefery R. Collins, “Redeeming the 
Enlightenment: New Histories of Religious Toleration,” he Journal of Modern History 81, no. 3 
(2009): 607– 36.
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civilization.6 He also rejected Mario Turchetti’s highly inluential thesis that few 
early moderns argued for toleration conceived in a modern sense, but simply 
for temporally and geographically limited forms of toleration that would func-
tion in the absence of religious concord.7 For Caravale, Pucci’s ideas of toleration 
instead took two forms. First, in accordance with the ideas of Guillaume Posthu-
mus Meyjes, he argued that Pucci could be categorized as a “utopian irenicist.” 
Secondly, he suggested that Pucci’s heterodox soteriology contained a seed that 
subsequently grew into a doctrine of toleration conceived in the modern sense.8
An analysis of two documents written by Pucci between 1578 and 1581, a 
letter written to the Calvinist minister Niccolò Balbani, and the Forma di una 
republica catholica, suggests that Caravale’s analysis may be challenged on two 
grounds.9 First, although it is possible, broadly speaking, to categorize Pucci 
as an irenicist, Meyjes’s category does not capture fully the complexity of his 
thought.10 Some of his ideas are closer to those of the irenicists that Meyjes 
termed “confessional” and neither category accommodates the intolerance that 
structured Pucci’s thinking. Secondly, it may be true that later thinkers drew 
upon Pucci’s soteriological ideas to develop doctrines of modern toleration, but 
such a reading of Pucci’s theology seriously misrepresents its intolerant implica-
tions. In any case, it is misleading to use later interpretations of his work to make 
inferences about his original intentions.
he foregoing discussion suggests that Pucci’s thought cannot be readily 
classiied according to existing historiographical and/or philosophical categories 
deployed by intellectual historians. It is therefore helpful to approach his ideas 
from a diferent perspective. Over the last ten years, historians such as Benja-
min Kaplan and Alexandra Walsham have shited the focus of research on early 
modern toleration away from theories and their application and toward studies 
of examples of practical coexistence within European society.11 hey have pro-
6Caravale, Profeta, 24– 29.
7Mario Turchetti, “Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth- Century 
France,” Sixteenth Century Journal 22, no. 1 (1991): 15– 25. For Caravale’s critique of Turchetti’s 
thesis, see Caravale, Profeta, 191– 93.
8Caravale, Profeta, 193.
9his letter, “A Niccolò Balbani in Ginevra (Basilea, autunno 1578),” is published in Francesco 
Pucci, Lettere documenti e testimonianze, ed. Luigi Firpo and Renato Piattoli (Florence: Olschki, 
1955), 1:23– 54. Cantimori discovered the Forma and suspected it was written by Pucci; see Canti-
mori, Eretici, 378– 92. His contention was conirmed by Firpo; see Firpo, “Gli scritti di Francesco 
Pucci,” Memorie dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, ser. 3, vol. 4, pt. 2, 30– 32. Cantimori sub-
sequently published a transcription of the Forma, which I have used in this article. See Delio Can-
timori and Elisabeth Feist, eds., Per la storia degli eretici italiani del secolo XVI in Europa (Rome: 
Reale Academia d’Italia, 1937), 171– 209.
10See Guillaume Posthumus Meyjes, “Tolérance et irénisme,” in he Emergence of Tolerance in 
the Dutch Republic, ed. Christiane Berkvens- Stevelinck, Jonathan Israel, and Guillaume Posthumus 
Meyjes (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 63– 73; for his deinition of the term “irenicism,” see 63– 65; for a deini-
tion of “utopian irenicism,” see 66.
11Walsham, Charitable Hatred; Kaplan, Divided by Faith.
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vided a new insight into the practical ways in which contemporaries sought to 
maintain social peace within religiously divided communities. Pucci used his 
writings on toleration to develop a framework to address precisely these prob-
lems, while also ensuring salvation for as many as possible. His task was compli-
cated by his heterodox convictions, which engendered an unusually intolerant 
stance toward other Christians. To achieve his ends, he drew upon, but did not 
slavishly follow, parts of the contemporary repertoire of ideas about toleration.
Pucci was horriied by the violence and disruption of sixteenth- century 
Europe. Like many of his direct contemporaries, he desired concord— a single 
uniied faith, but the soteriological beliefs that he developed in his letter to Bal-
bani led him to advocate a profoundly intolerant rendering of this concept. For 
Pucci, salvation solely depended upon individuals making a rational choice to 
believe in God. Although he maintained that no religious practices or rites were 
fundamental to salvation, he also held that correct religious practice was a mani-
festation of true belief. he corollary of this position was that incorrect practices 
made manifest misplaced belief. He therefore argued that God condemned all 
who engaged in corrupted practices. A single, clearly deined faith was essential 
in order to assure salvation for all.12
hese central insights laid the ground for Pucci’s subsequent relections on 
religious toleration, which were contained in the Forma. his text contained a 
template for a secret society that would nestle within confessional states. It would, 
Pucci hoped, allow like- minded Christians to band together to lay the founda-
tions for a council that would establish the true faith. While waiting for this 
to occur, its members would outwardly observe the religion of their host com-
munity, but privately practice a theology of reduction. hey would restrict their 
religious practice to the observance of certain key beliefs— the essential points 
such as acceptance of the Ten Commandments— on which all Christians could 
agree. Supericially, this proposal resembled the forms of irenicism advocated 
by humanists such as Desiderius Erasmus and subsequently developed by inlu-
ential authors such as Sebastian Castellio. hese authors distinguished between 
fundamenta— beliefs essential to the faith— and adiaphora— things indiferent to 
the faith. By reducing the number of fundamenta, they suggested that Christians 
could maintain the unity of their faith while accommodating oten signiicant 
diferences.13
12I follow here Turchetti’s concept of concord; see Turchetti, “Religious concord,” 15– 19.
13For an overview of the issue of irenicism in theory and practice, see Kaplan, “he Gold 
Coin,” in Divided by Faith, 127– 43. On Erasmus’s “theology of reduction” and its inluence on 
Castellio, see Hans R. Guggisberg, “he Defence of Religious Toleration and Religious Liberty in 
Early Modern Europe: Arguments, Pressures and Some Consequences,” History of European Ideas 
4, no. 1 (1983): 37– 39; Mario Turchetti, “Une question mal posée: Erasme et la tolérance, L’idée de 
sygkatabasis,” Bibliothèque d’humanisme et Renaissance 53, no. 2 (1991): 379– 95, cf. his rejection 
of Erasmus’s inluence on Castellio, Turchetti, “Religious Concord,” 20– 21. See also Gary Remer, 
“Humanism, Liberalism, and the Skeptical Case for Religious Toleration,” Polity 25, no. 1 (1992): 21– 
43, who makes the important point that humanist toleration was not “full toleration” as individuals 
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In the Forma, Pucci advocated the practice of a theology of reduction, but his 
heterodox soteriology led him to render this idea in a manner that difered in two 
key respects from that of the humanist irenicists. First, since Pucci maintained 
that God condemned all who engaged in erroneous practices, there could be no 
adiaphora about which Christians could agree to difer. Consequently, it was 
essential that the members of his society refrained from all actions and practices 
that were uncertain. Secondly, the humanist irenicists argued that by reducing 
the faith to its most basic elements, they could create a durable form of concord 
that was rooted in the acceptance— or indeed toleration— of religious diference. 
Pucci’s proposed theology of reduction was, by contrast, a short- term expedient. 
It would be used only within his society, and it would be abandoned once the true 
fundamenta of the faith had been established by a council. his new deinition of 
Christianity, rather than his theology of reduction, would provide the basis for 
concord.
hese insights provide a means to answer a question let hanging by Miriam 
Eliav- Feldon, an earlier historian of the Forma, namely: what was the society’s 
purpose? She argued that Pucci’s intentions remained unclear. He was in fact 
ofering a genuine proposal for a society, albeit one never implemented. Practic-
ing their pared- down version of Christianity, the society’s members would live 
and worship together without fear of engaging in the corrupted practices that 
endangered their salvation. his society would continue to exist until such times 
as a council could deine the true parameters of the faith. Once this had been 
achieved, the society could be dissolved. he fundamenta having been estab-
lished, the former citizens of Pucci’s society, like all who considered themselves 
Christian, would be expected— and if necessary compelled— to respect these 
truths.14
The Lettera a Balbani
In 1563, Francesco Pucci let his native Italy, beginning a long exile in north-
ern Europe. By 1572, he lived in Paris where he witnessed the St. Bartholomew’s 
Day massacre, and converted to Calvinism in its wake.15 hat winter, seeking to 
escape the chaos that followed the killing, he moved to England. Ater matricu-
lating in the faculty of arts at the University of Oxford, he dedicated himself to 
the study of philosophy and theology. In 1574, he graduated with the degree of 
Master of Arts and upon returning to London, he established contact with the 
remained accountable for the fundamenta, 28. For a further discussion of the limits of Erasmus’s 
conception of tolerance, see Nathan Ron, “he Christian Peace of Erasmus,” he European Legacy 
19, no. 1 (2014): 27– 42.
14Miriam Eliav- Feldon, “Secret Societies, Utopias, and Peace Plans: he Case of Francesco 
Pucci,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 14 (1984): 139– 58, 49.
15For an account of Pucci’s life to this time, see Caravale, Profeta, chaps. 1– 2; for his conver-
sion, 79– 80.
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city’s French Calvinist church.16 He fell into dispute with the Church authori-
ties ater demanding the right to speak on religious matters and indicating that 
he believed that he was a prophet.17 Having let England in 1576, he returned to 
Paris, and ater spending the winter there, he continued to Basel where he met 
fellow Italian exile Fausto Sozzini. By 1578, the two men had begun to dispute 
several theological questions, including the issue of the mortality of Adam.18 In 
the autumn of that year, at the height of his dispute with Sozzini, Pucci also wrote 
a lengthy letter to the Lucchese nobleman Niccolò Balbani (henceforth Lettera), 
then minister for the Italian church in Geneva, in which he detailed his views on 
issues such as original sin, justiication, and salvation.19
he Lettera contains a detailed exposition of the theological beliefs that Pucci 
held in the late 1570s. He rarely expressed his ideas directly or systematically. 
More oten than not, his positive views on theological matters were advanced 
through a critique of the positions held by others. In order to reconstruct his 
ideas, it is necessary to follow his oten circuitous argument as it develops, draw-
ing connections between the various positions that he advanced and identifying 
the features that gave his theology an underlying cohesion. his approach has 
the advantage of preserving the characteristically digressive nature of his prose, 
while exposing the foundations of his thought.
Pucci opened the Lettera with a plea to be given a fair hearing. Too oten, 
he lamented, men were inclined to hate someone who contradicted their views 
before listening to what they actually had to say. He then rapidly moved on to 
discuss what he took to be the central problem that needed to be addressed. Inter-
preters of scripture had long tied themselves up in numerous errors. Among the 
most important was maintaining an unduly negative view of human nature. As a 
consequence of this error, they were unable to recognize “the state of innocence 
in which all men are born and in which they remain until the use of reason and 
of judgment, when they are not yet steeped in the malice of the way of the world.” 
Having failed to comprehend this fundamental insight, “they commonly ignore 
the divine truth and turn their back on the Creator, following human and false 
instruction and teachings.”20 his statement introduced many of the themes that 
Pucci would elaborate in his letter, namely the errors of the exegetes, and their 
responsibility for imposing false doctrines on their fellow Christians.
his passage from the Lettera also points to the content of his theological 
beliefs. His comments on man’s innocence raised the issue of the nature of origi-
nal sin, a concept that lay at the heart of orthodox soteriology. Pucci set out his 
intention to grapple with this issue, by declaring almost immediately that all 
16Firpo, “Pucci in Inghilterra,” 160.
17Firpo, “Pucci in Inghilterra,” 161– 62.
18For an account of Pucci’s time in Basel, see Caravale, Profeta, 85; on the dispute with Sozzini, 
see Cantimori, Eretici, chap. 32.
19Pucci, “A Balbani,” 23– 54.
20Pucci, “A Balbani,” 24– 25. All translations are the author’s.
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mortals were born in a state of salvation. He continued that he would demon-
strate “that the anger of God and damnation hangs over only those who acquire 
it for themselves, by faith turned elsewhere than to the Creator and by the way-
ward manner in which they act contrary to the divine Spirit and sentiment.”21 
Pucci’s position was clear, albeit highly controversial. Since all humans are born 
in a state of salvation, they are damned only as a result of their own free actions. 
Assuming such a position involved the denial of multiple positions held and elab-
orated by generations of theologians.
At the heart of Pucci’s rebellion against orthodoxy lay a denial of the propo-
sition that all men are born in a state of damnation. Forms of this idea dated back 
to the earliest Church Fathers, but it received its most signiicant articulation in 
the writings that Augustine produced during the course of his polemics against 
the Pelagians. He argued that following the fall of man, each individual inherited 
the original sin of Adam, and so it was transmitted by propagation and not by 
imitation.22 Not only had original sin rendered man unable to perform unaided 
any actions pleasing in the eyes of God, but it also damned each individual. 
According to the position that Augustine advanced in De civitate dei, in order 
to be released from this merited and justiied punishment, it was necessary to be 
baptized. For Augustine, this sacrament remitted the original sin. Yet even in this 
new condition, man retained concupiscence, a constant inclination towards sin. 
From the point at which man became able to obey the law, he assumed respon-
sibility for ensuring that he did not act upon that inclination. He would only be 
successful in his endeavors, however, if God granted him prevenient grace, which 
would allow him to have the faith that would make it possible to resist his innate 
tendency to sin. A gratuitous and totally unmerited git of God, grace was only 
granted to those whom he chose. hey alone would be one of the elect. hose 
whom God overlooked would be numbered amongst the reprobate.23
Aspects of Augustine’s thought remained hugely inluential throughout the 
medieval period, but his theological views came to be held in especially high 
regard from the mid- iteenth to the mid- eighteenth centuries.24 It would obvi-
ously be wrong to suggest that during this period, every Christian accepted each 
of his views in their entirety, or that they necessarily agreed as to how to interpret 
his corpus.25 Yet while the soteriologies of the main confessions of the later six-
21Pucci, “A Balbani,” 25.
22See William E. Mann, “Augustine on Evil and Original Sin,” in he Cambridge Companion 
to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 47– 48.
23Saint Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003), 21.16.
24Anthony D. Wright, characterizes this period in western Christian history as the “Augustin-
ian Moment”; see Wright, he Counter Reformation: Catholic Europe and the Non- Christian World, 
2nd ed. (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2005), esp. “Introduction: he Counter- Reformation and Augustinian 
Europe,” 1– 33.
25For a discussion of these issues, see Arnoud Visser, Reading Augustine in the Reformation: 
he Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1520– 1620 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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teenth century contained signiicant diferences of emphasis, each continued to 
subscribe to key Augustinian doctrines. hese included belief in the inheritance 
of original sin and man’s subsequent corruption, and the idea that both baptism 
and faith were necessary for salvation.26 Moreover, they also all agreed that faith 
was impossible without the gratuitous git of grace. As we shall see, Pucci not 
only rejected these core ideas, but he also difered from the theologians of the 
main confessions in his apparent outright rejection of the authority of the Church 
Fathers. He only mentions them when he is seeking to rebut their positions, and 
he appears to view them as being responsible for establishing the views that he 
sought to contest. Pucci thus set his face against mainstream theological opinion, 
and aimed to prove his case solely by invoking the authority of scripture.27
Using these means Pucci was able to conclude that original sin undoubtedly 
existed. “It is certainly true,” he wrote, “that there is a great defect in the nature 
of all we mortals by reason of the corruption which entered us from the sin of 
our irst parents, with respect to this defect God says that the inclination of the 
human heart turns towards wickedness from its youth.”28 Although this state-
ment was broadly in accordance with received theological opinion, he rapidly 
departed from it with his further assertion that “one will never ind that this 
original defect has imputed eternal damnation to anyone.”29 According to Pucci, 
God did not hold individual humans personally accountable for the sin of Adam. 
No one would be damned as a result of his actions, and as a consequence, there 
was no need for God’s grace in order to secure salvation. Nevertheless, origi-
nal sin had implanted in each individual a tendency towards sinful behavior. 
God remained, however, merciful not only toward original sin, but also towards 
sins committed. Consequently, he had sent Christ, through whom all would be 
excused of their sins provided that they did not incur God’s wrath. His creatures 
could provoke his ire either by displays of diidence towards him or by living a 
wicked life.
Continuing his assault on orthodox theology, Pucci demonstrated how 
Christianity had come to be dominated by false doctrines. To understand the 
26For a statement of the position established by Catholic Church on these issues by the mid- 
sixteenth century, see decrees of the ith and sixth sessions of the Council of Trent in J. Waterworth, 
trans., he Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent (London: Dolman, 
1848), 21– 29, 30– 53. For Luther, see, for example, J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston, trans., Martin 
Luther On the Bondage of the Will, A New Translation of De servo arbitrio (1525): Martin Luther’s 
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam (London: James Clarke, 1957). For Calvin, see John Calvin, Institutes 
of the Christian Religion, 3 vols., trans. Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 
1845– 46), on his soteriology: bk. 2, 1:279–542; on baptism: bk. 4, chap. 15, 3:327–48.
27See for example Manfred Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,” in he Reception 
of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: 
Brill, 1997), 2:537– 626; Johannes Van Oort, “John Calvin and the Church Fathers,” in Reception of 
the Church Fathers in the West, 2:661– 700.
28Pucci, “A Balbani,” 25.
29Pucci, “A Balbani,” 25.
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origin of this error, he argued, it was necessary to consider the language “used 
not only by the prophets, but by other good authors, and very frequently used in 
the common tongue, that is, to call the disciples children and the masters father 
of whatever thing it is.” For Pucci, this was an apt metaphor because as “fathers 
generate children similar to themselves in body, so masters, by teaching, make 
something similar to themselves in that faculty that they teach.” Examples of 
regeneration through training were readily observable in the society around 
him; through a process of instruction and education philosophers made new phi-
losophers, and theologians made new theologians. According to this manner of 
speaking, each master “calls himself the father of those in his school.”30
he false belief that every individual inherited original sin stemmed from 
biblical exegetes’ failure to recognize that this metaphor was also deployed in 
scripture. Seemingly referring to the books of prophecy in the Old Testament, 
Pucci noted that when God sent masters to preach to badly instructed men “oten 
they recognized them as ill- born and badly created, that is badly taught and 
instructed.” hus when the prophets talked of individuals being “ill- born,” they 
referred not to a literal, but to a igurative birth. hey recognized that an individ-
ual was shaped by the society in which he grew up, and by the teachers by whom 
he was instructed. When the prophets referred to the Jews as “ill- born,” they did 
not do so because they regarded them to be innately sinful. Instead they con-
demned them for practicing a false version of the faith that had been inculcated 
in them by the society in which they lived. Pucci observed that “he interpreters 
have oten (and especially in the Gospel of St. John and in the letters of St. Paul) 
taken that which was said against this birth of the false sects, as if it were said of 
human nature and of the common birth of the body from the mother.” Interpret-
ers of scripture had therefore made a catastrophic error; they had confused man’s 
igurative birth with his literal one.31
his is a pivotal stage in Pucci’s argument. Not only did he once more reject 
the idea that man was born incapable of acting in a manner pleasing to God, 
but he also expanded his discussion in a surprising direction. He suggested that 
sinful behavior was, in many instances, collective learned behavior. Misguided 
instruction had not only failed to show individuals how to overcome their innate 
tendency to sin, but had actually taught them to behave in a sinful manner. here 
are signiicant implications to Pucci’s argument. If one happened to be born and 
raised in a society that indulged in debased or corrupted practices, these would 
appear normal to the members of that society. Sin would permeate that society. 
Yet this sin would not be the product of individual deviance, but the result of col-
lective malpractice that was erroneously considered not only acceptable, but in 
fact also pleasing to God.
30Pucci, “A Balbani,” 34.
31Pucci, “A Balbani,” 35.
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It was hard to dislodge such values and practices from a given society. he 
masters would routinely teach them to that society’s children, who would in turn 
teach them to their children. Generation ater generation of sinners would be 
iguratively born. By engaging in and teaching these corrupted activities, these 
societies would be securing not only their own damnation, but also preparing 
future generations to condemn themselves. Pucci’s insight also carries the impli-
cation that this corruption begins with the teachers, and in particular with the 
priesthood. Not only were the priests actively engaged in preaching their false-
hoods, but they also compelled their locks to accept them; in so doing, they 
rotted Christian society from within. By dutifully rendering obedience to the 
priestly caste, whole swathes of Christian society allowed themselves to become 
sinners.
Pucci then turned to anticipate some objections to his opinion, which 
required him to engage with the scriptural foundations of orthodox theology. 
He began by considering the grounds for asserting that God would punish indi-
viduals for sins that they had not personally committed. First he discussed Deu-
teronomy 5:9, which describes the punishment with which God threatened the 
Jews should they fail to respect the second commandment enjoining them to 
refrain from worshipping idols. he passage in question reads, “I the Lord am a 
jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third 
and fourth generation that hates me.”32 hese words could be taken to imply 
that individuals are punished on account of the actions of their forebears, and 
irrespective of their own behavior. According to Pucci, it would be misguided to 
understand this passage in this manner. God does not say that he will punish all 
physical descendants of sinners, but instead, “one sees that he treats of the imita-
tors of the wicked fathers.” In other words, God only threatened to punish the 
igurative “children,” those who continued to perpetuate the iniquities of their 
“parents.” Nevertheless, Pucci added, “I readily concede that to the wayward evil- 
living all sins are taken into account.” Pucci’s point was clear; scripture shows 
that while God may justly punish an individual, it will only be for the sins that 
he has committed.33
It may appear from reading the foregoing discussion that Pucci tended 
toward a works- based understanding of the economy of salvation. While this 
may be a reasonable assumption based on the arguments thus far presented, he 
continued his letter by introducing some new elements that radically recast his 
beliefs. he most important development in his argument took place during a 
discussion of baptism. Most understandings of this rite were, he argued, based on 
a false assumption that the need to remit original sin had made baptism neces-
sary. his error, he argued, stemmed from a misinterpretation of a passage in the 
Gospel of Mark. Pucci cited the passage of scripture in Italian as follows: “Chi 
32All translations are from the King James Version (KJV).
33Pucci, “A Balbani,” 37.
Tarrant / Concord and Toleration 993
crederà e sarà battezato, sarà salvo.” In full, the verse reads, “He that believeth 
and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned” (Mark 
16:16). Pucci remarked that “having heard it said that the believers and the bap-
tized will be saved, it has been concluded with little reason that one will not be 
saved if one is not baptized.” For Pucci this was a clear error. he passage did 
not imply that the unbaptized would not be saved, but only those who did not 
believe.34 He bolstered this point by making the more general observation that 
the failure to perform rituals pleasing to God, even highly important ones, was 
not suicient to debar an individual from salvation. he Jews, he noted, did not 
circumcise the babies who were born during their forty years in the wilderness.35
In this passage, Pucci had not only developed his views on the soteriologi-
cal signiicance of religious practice, but also airmed the centrality of belief. 
Elaborating his position, he continued that “the blame for non- belief does not 
fall upon children, or on those who do not have the use of reason or judgment, 
as Zwingli, Pighio, and others opposed to Augustine have seen. hus, when one 
treats of faith or misbelief, all discussion pertains to adults, who are either believ-
ers or unbelievers, not to children.”36 his being the case, only those who were of 
suicient age and possessed of the requisite mental faculties would be judged on 
account of their belief or lack thereof. With these words, Pucci took a further step 
by suggesting that faith was the product of a rational choice. Since this free choice 
was suicient to ensure salvation, there was no need for either the remission of 
sin or prevenient grace.
Pucci then proceeded to discuss a number of Paul’s epistles. hese were 
foundational texts in the history of Christianity. Generations of exegetes had 
drawn upon them to formulate many of the key doctrines that Pucci wished to 
contest. He began with the Apostle’s famous declaration that we “were by nature 
children of wrath, even as the others” (Eph. 2:3). his passage had oten been 
taken as a proof of the idea that man had inherited original sin. For Pucci, such 
an interpretation was simply mistaken. Once again, exegetes had failed to under-
stand the language of scripture. In this passage, Paul did not speak of human 
nature in its original state, but of human nature once it had been corrupted by 
wicked customs. Reprising his earlier suggestion that habits and manners are 
formed by the society in which individuals live, he wrote that we are “commonly 
carried along by the low of the world and of the errors of the sects, that are held 
in high regard in those countries where we live.” When the Apostle made use of 
the word “nature,” he did so in order to criticize those behaviors and habits that 
were so deeply established within human societies that they had become almost 
natural. Pucci concluded that “With regard to that manner of speaking ‘children 
34Pucci, “A Balbani,” 38.
35Pucci, “A Balbani,” 39– 40; the story to which Pucci referred is in Josh. 5:1– 8.
36Pucci, “A Balbani,” 38.
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of wrath,’ it is certain that to him it is an ebraismo, which means ‘culpable for 
anger and for contempt by reason of sins committed.’”37
Pucci gathered the various threads of his argument in the course of a dis-
cussion of Paul’s epistle to the Romans. He began by considering the contents 
of chapter 9 in which the Apostle discussed the story of Esau and Jacob. his 
passage, Pucci rightly noted, had been used as a “secure foundation to prove this 
hatred of God ab aeterno.”38 In other words, it had been used to gainsay the belief 
that from the beginning of time God had nursed a hatred for Esau, which is to 
say from before he was born and before he could personally sin. In turn, this 
contention had been taken to imply that God had predestined the fate of each 
individual. Pucci noted that “it is certain that this place is a little obscure, as St. 
Peter said speaking of the writings of St. Paul.” his was a reference to 2 Peter 
3:16 in which Peter noted that Paul’s letters contained “things hard to be under-
stood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other 
scriptures, unto their own destruction.” Pucci thus exploited a biblical precedent 
for acknowledging the complexity and indeed the ambiguity of Paul’s writings, 
which he took to imply that the misinterpretation of his words was not only pos-
sible, but in fact likely. his set the tone for his discussion; he would criticize the 
interpreters of Paul, while seeking to rediscover his “true” message.39
he error of maintaining that God harbored an eternal contempt for Esau 
came, Pucci argued, from misunderstandings of the manner in which Paul had 
cited scripture. First, he noted that the Apostle had drawn on the following pas-
sage of Genesis: “the elder shall serve the younger” (Rom. 9:12). Pucci recon-
textualized this extract. First he quoted it in full. In this passage God directly 
addressed Rebecca— then pregnant with the twins— saying: “Two nations are in 
thy womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels; and the 
one people shall be stronger than the other people; and the elder shall serve the 
younger” (Gen. 25:23). Glossing this text, Pucci noted, “Here there is no doubt 
that the prophecy spoke of two nations, because the Edomites descended from 
Esau and the Israelites descended from Jacob, and the Israelites in the end tri-
umphed over the Edomites.” Pucci then turned to address a second passage of 
scripture cited by Paul, this time from Malachi, which read, “Jacob have I loved, 
but Esau have I hated” (Rom. 9:13). Again he cited the original passage in full, “I 
loved Jacob, and I hated Esau, and laid his mountains and his heritage waste for 
the dragons of the wilderness” (Mal. 1:2– 3). Expounding the text’s meaning, he 
argued that once again it did not refer to individual brothers, but “without doubt 
it speaks of the two nations.”40
37Pucci, “A Balbani,” 40– 41.
38Pucci, “A Balbani,” 41. For an account of the gradual development of Augustine’s interpreta-
tion of Rom. 9, see James Wetzel, “Predestination, Pelagianism, and foreknowledge,” in Stump and 
Kretzman, Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 52– 53.
39Pucci, “A Balbani,” 41.
40Pucci, “A Balbani,” 41– 42.
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According to Pucci, previous exegetes made two errors while explaining 
the meaning of Romans 9. First, they confused the individual brothers with the 
tribes that they had respectively founded. “You see therefore that in both these 
prophecies the diference between one nation and the other is spoken of, and the 
irst spoke of that which had to occur, and the other of that which had occurred, 
and that both spoke of the current state of the people.” Secondly, they read the 
earlier passage of scripture in light of the later one. God certainly spoke of his 
hatred for Esau in Malachi, but exegetes had mistakenly projected this statement 
onto the passage from Genesis, and assumed that God had always hated Esau. On 
this basis, they had concluded that Esau was ab aeterno reprobate and excluded 
from salvation.41
hose who maintained this position were, according to Pucci, “deceiving 
themselves.” On the one hand, exegetes had simply extrapolated too much from 
scripture, for neither passage made any explicit mention of Esau’s personal eter-
nal damnation. On the other, the word “hate” was only used in reference to Esau 
in Malachi. his text was written, Pucci noted, ater the Jews had returned from 
Babylon, that is, more than a thousand years ater the children’s birth. he use 
of the word “hate” in the later text therefore denoted a change in God’s attitude 
towards Esau, one that had occurred at some point between the completion of 
the two texts. God’s hatred was therefore not eternal, but had started at a par-
ticular point in time.42 Returning to his irst criticism of earlier interpretations 
of Romans, Pucci continued, “we have seen that the irst [passage] like the second 
did not speak of the persons of these two individuals, but of the nations that 
descended from them; and in one and in the other there were some believers and 
some unbelievers, and as a consequence some elect and some reprobate.” Accord-
ing to his interpretation of Romans, God neither hated the person Esau, nor did 
he automatically confer this hatred onto his descendants. All of Abraham and 
Isaac’s descendants had the potential to be saved or to be damned.
For Pucci, this failure to discern the true meaning of Paul’s discussion of 
the divergent stories of the Israelites and the Edomites was underlain by a wider 
misunderstanding of his purpose in this letter. In the Apostle’s own age, a divi-
sion had opened within his people, the Jews, among whom there were “some 
who denied the Messiah, who were the party unfavourable to the Apostle, others 
embraced him, who were the Christians.” he fact that the majority of the Jews 
rejected Paul’s message could have led the Romans to doubt the truth of this 
promise made to the descendants of Abraham and Isaac. Paul’s task was to main-
tain the credibility of the promise of salvation, while explaining his fellow Jews’ 
rejection of Christ. he difering fates of Jacob and Esau and their respective 
tribes ofered a means to explain why only some among the chosen people would 
41Pucci, “A Balbani,” 42– 43.
42Pucci, “A Balbani,” 42– 43.
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be given eternal happiness, although all were descended from Abraham and 
Isaac.43
Pucci went on to expound his interpretation of Paul’s argument in more 
detail. In the course of his discussion, he began to set out his ideas on the proper 
relationship between faith and works in the economy of salvation. Following 
Paul’s arguments, he asserted that there could be no good works without faith. 
he prophecy made in Genesis was not concerned primarily with the actions that 
the twins would eventually perform, but with the root cause of those actions. If 
Esau acted in ways displeasing to God, it was because he lacked true faith. Simi-
larly, the Israelites and Edomites were equally called by God and each individual 
member of the tribes possessed the capacity to respond to his calls. he Edomites 
certainly brought God’s wrath upon themselves by performing actions that were 
displeasing to him, but for Pucci these perverse actions were signs of a more sig-
niicant afront. he Edomites had not truly believed. If they had done so, then 
they would have been capable of behaving in a manner pleasing to God. hey too 
could have been saved. Since they did not believe, they had acted in a manner 
displeasing to God and so justly earned his punishment.44
he damnation of the Edomites was not inevitable, however. hey had nei-
ther lacked, nor ever lost, the capacity to believe. As we have seen, according 
to Pucci, faith is the product of a free and rational choice. Recall, however, that 
Pucci maintained that human behaviors and habits, including an individual’s 
choice to embrace correct belief, are shaped and formed by the society in which 
he or she lives. he observation of societal norms could encourage the majority, 
if not the entirety, of a given society— for example the Edomites— to hold mis-
placed beliefs, and thus to act in ways that merited God’s hatred. Yet the inluence 
of social factors was no excuse, for the decision to embrace faith was made by 
individuals. Pucci’s discussion led his reader to the conclusion that God’s hatred 
towards the Edomites was not predestined. Instead, God had foreseen that Jacob 
and Esau and the tribes that they respectively founded would make difering 
choices with respect to their internal faith.
By refusing to acknowledge Christ as the Messiah and failing to have faith in 
him, the majority of the Jews likewise incurred God’s wrath. As a consequence, 
the Jews living ater the revelation of Christ were not capable of fulilling the 
law truly, but were instead engaging in corrupted practices. he Jews made this 
choice not because they were badly created, and certainly not because God had 
predestined them to be among the reprobate. For Pucci, this was not Paul’s opin-
ion; “rather, a little later he said that they were loved by God by reason of their 
fathers, but he had a bad opinion of those who were contradicting the call of 
the Messiah, by their distrust and waywardness.”45 Although the Jews had dis-
43Pucci, “A Balbani,” 43– 44.
44Pucci, “A Balbani,” 44.
45Pucci, “A Balbani,” 44.
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graced themselves in God’s eyes, their disgrace would only last for so long as 
they persisted in maintaining a false version of their faith. Should they choose to 
believe truly, they too could be, in Paul’s words, grated back into the olive tree. 
Although the Jews could have been saved, the habits and traditions that they 
maintained and taught as a society more oten than not prevented them from 
making the rational choice to embrace Christ as savior.
Pucci’s soteriological commitments held signiicant implications for any 
attempt to establish peace within Christendom. His radical decision to place sal-
vation in man’s hands elevated the signiicance of human free will and indeed 
reason. Yet since he also maintained that belief could be shaped by society, he 
placed a new emphasis on the social control of behavior and action. he practice 
of corrupted rites or ceremonies invited God’s anger and retribution, so indi-
vidual Christians needed to be protected not only from their own errors, but also 
from the perverted teachings of their societies. his could only be achieved by 
establishing a form of concord that excluded beliefs deined as false. Pucci did 
not explicitly develop these themes in the Lettera, but began to tease out their 
implications in more detail in the Forma.
The Forma di una republica catholica
Pucci completed the text of the Forma following his return to England from Swit-
zerland in 1581. It sets out his ideas for a secret society, described in oten surpris-
ing detail. he most basic level of organization would be a college, a small cell 
of like- minded believers. Outwardly the members of the colleges would render 
full obedience to the religious and civic authorities of the communities in which 
they resided. Behind closed doors, they would practice their own forms of reli-
gion. Pucci described these beliefs and practices in some detail, and they will be 
discussed more fully below. he various colleges would be established wherever 
there were enough sympathetic individuals, and linked so as to form a network. 
Pucci described the oicials who would organize and administer the various 
levels of the society, and even how the dispersed colleges would communicate 
and the manner in which decisions afecting the whole Republic could be made 
via a general diet. Pucci’s text concluded with a supplementary section, the Dis-
ciplina domestica, which described how the members should organize various 
practical aspects of their community.46
From the start of the Forma, Pucci signaled his intention to address the 
broader issue of establishing peace within Christendom. It opens with the fol-
lowing words: “If it is possible by the limited understanding of man to ind some 
remedy for the confusion that one sees today in religion and the Christian repub-
lic, the means cannot be anything other than a free and holy council, to which 
46Pucci, Forma. For a further description of the organization of the society, see Cantimori, 
Eretici, 380– 92; and Eliav- Feldon, “Secret Societies,” 144– 48.
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one sees all good men of all the provinces are inclined.” Despite the violence 
that he had personally witnessed, and regardless of the self- evident failure of the 
Council of Trent to resolve Europe’s religious divisions, Pucci still believed that 
a inal settlement to the religious crisis of his age could be reached by means of 
discussion. His optimism originated partly in a strong belief in the power of the 
laity, or at least those good men, who shared the opinion that “the source of this 
disorder comes from the doctrine and the uncorrected lives of the ecclesiastics.” 
Nevertheless, the fact that the clergy lay at the root of the problem presented a 
signiicant challenge for any would- be reformer, not least because “one knows 
well that the powerful prelates, who foresee that this [a council] would be the ruin 
of their great temporal power, impede it in any way that they can.” So for Pucci, 
although a council could be the means to resolve the sixteenth- century religious 
crisis, it remained an aspiration rather than an imminent possibility.47
In the absence of any helpful leadership from the ecclesiastical hierarchy, it 
seemed to Pucci that the burden of resolving the religious crisis lay on the shoul-
ders of the laity. It was borne by men such as him. here remained, he observed, 
many ordinary Christians who were alienated by the present state of afairs. 
So many, in fact, that it would be possible to fashion them into a new republic. 
“herefore one sees that he who could unite, in some reasonable manner, [those] 
well- disposed towards the public good who are divided one from the other by dis-
tance of place and by diferences of customs and ceremonies, could prepare a it-
ting residence for the future council.”48 At the most basic level, Pucci’s ambition 
was precisely this; to unite disafected yet faithful members of the laity, in order 
that they might create a suitable environment for the convocation of a council.
Pucci did not directly comment on the type of Christian peace that he 
expected a council to establish, but it is possible to reconstruct his ideas from 
comments he made regarding the form that his society should take. Pucci 
believed that before his society could be called into existence, he would need to 
establish the beliefs to which its members should adhere. “It being most certain,” 
he wrote, “that one cannot order a community with a durable and good govern-
ment without religious accord, it is irst necessary that our citizens are resolved 
as to how they should govern themselves with regard to matters divine, and that 
they know well which belief is accepted by their senate and people.” Although 
these remarks were speciically directed at future society members, the principle 
behind them presumably applied to Christendom more widely. Good and stable 
government required clear deinitions of the faith.49
Following this principle, Pucci laid down a series of requirements for mem-
bers of his society. Of these, the most fundamental was the requirement that all 
47Pucci, Forma, 171. It remains unclear what Pucci regarded as the source of a council’s 
authority. It is likely to have difered markedly from Erasmus’s concept of the consensus omnium; 
on this idea, see Remer, “Skeptical Case,” 24– 28.
48Pucci, Forma, 172.
49Pucci, Forma, 174.
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should be Christians. His deinition of a Christian amounted to the acceptance 
of a number of speciic propositions: that God was the creator of the universe, 
that Christ had taken human form, that Christians should love just one God, and 
that Jesus had been sent for their salvation. Although Christians could readily 
accept these ideas, Pucci went on to express views that were more controversial. 
He added that members of his society should confess that “by means of [Christ’s] 
death and resurrection we are washed of our sins and human defects and we have 
most certain hope of resurrection, and they are persuaded by this most certain 
thing that God takes count of the good and of the bad, and reserves a reward for 
the good, and punishment for the bad.”50 With these words, he seemed to imply 
that being a “Christian” entailed the acceptance of the idea that God punishes or 
rewards individuals according to their behavior. Implicitly, it required accepting 
his heterodox opinion that no one was excluded from the possibility of salvation.
Although eager to establish clear parameters for belief, Pucci was aware that 
deining a “Christian” was complicated by the existence of many churches, each 
with its own particular ceremonies and interpretations of scripture. Obviously 
some, if not all, of them were propagating ideas contrary to the faith. No one could 
be sure which, if any, of these ideas and practices the members of his community 
should accept. Pucci noted this situation arose because Christianity had lacked a 
“supreme judge, or a council acceptable to all nations, which might declare point 
by point how things should be understood, and with divine authority restrain the 
contumacious and disobedient— the disputes and debates between the churches 
are without end.” With these comments, Pucci suggested that he did not believe 
that it was possible at that time to deine the truth of Christianity, but that it may 
be possible for an authority such as a council to establish Christian truth “point 
by point.” In other words, for Pucci, each aspect of Christian belief could and 
should be deined as being either true or false. Moreover, he suggested that if and 
when these truths were established, anyone who chose to dissent— the “contuma-
cious and disobedient”— could be restrained on God’s authority.51
Pucci thus envisaged a council establishing a form of concord quite distinct 
from that which the humanist irenicists such as Erasmus had proposed. Not only 
had the Dutch humanist advocated the punishment of Christians only in strictly 
limited circumstances, but more importantly, he had called for a form of concord 
that allowed for tolerance in relation to adiaphoral issues. Pucci rejected any such 
idea. His intolerance towards religious diference was consistent with the theo-
logical beliefs expressed in the Lettera, which had led him to the conclusion that 
the performance of corrupted rites and practices angered God and endangered 
each individual’s salvation. Should a reformed Christianity grant any tolerance 
to erroneous belief it would imperil the souls not simply of those who propagated 
those beliefs but also of any other Christians who might listen to them.
50Pucci, Forma, 175.
51Pucci, Forma, 176.
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Although Pucci’s long- term aim for his society was establishing the basis 
for a council that could implement an intolerant version of concord, he faced a 
more immediate problem. As he wrote, Christians were practicing false versions 
of the faith taught to them by the priests. He therefore needed to establish how to 
prevent Christians condemning themselves to damnation while they waited for 
a council to determine the true faith. Despite his zeal, Pucci was a pragmatist. 
Having acknowledged that a council was, at best, a distant prospect, he designed 
his society to perform a second purpose— providing a framework that would 
allow the laity to live and worship until such times as the truth of Christianity 
were determined.
To achieve this particular end, Pucci began to articulate his own version of a 
theology of reduction. In the absence of any clear deinition of orthodoxy, Pucci 
suggested that the citizens of his republic should retain only what he referred to 
as “catholic resolutions, that is universal resolutions of Christian doctrine and 
ceremony, and in the others they are free until the time of the future council.” 
hese were those doctrines and ceremonies that were acceptable to all Christians, 
whether Greek or Latin, Catholic or Protestant, Armenian, Syrian, Ethiopian, or 
Indian and “of all the other types of Christian of whom one has some knowledge.” 
hey were “those things which have been made known to the world by the Proph-
ets and by the Apostles the divine history and laws of our creator and savior.” he 
most important of these principles were presented in the Apostles’ Creed, the Ten 
Commandments and the Paternoster. He also recommended the performance of 
works of charity “which by the consensus of all the nations and laws are pleasing 
to God.” Since these practices and ideas were universally accepted as being good, 
and for the most part used and observed in similar ways, Pucci’s followers could 
be assured that they were pleasing to God.52
Pucci also adopted this approach when treating the ceremonies and sacra-
ments of the Church. Only two sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist, were uni-
versally acknowledged throughout Christendom. Although acknowledging that 
both sacraments had been interpreted in various diferent ways, Pucci suggested 
that the points of underlying agreement could once more be exposed. With regard 
to baptism, he suggested that it was a sign by which Christians professed them-
selves to be dead to sin. He continued that the external washing led to an internal 
renovation that consecrated man to God. In an echo of the position advanced in 
the Lettera, he argued that it obliged man to live no longer as an ill- formed crea-
ture shaped by the customs and manners of the world, but as a well- born creature 
made by God. His attitude towards the Eucharist was more straightforward. He 
suggested that it was universally recognized that man should consume bread and 
wine, and that they represented the body and blood of Christ. It seems that until 
the true doctrine of the Eucharist could be established, Pucci simply wanted his 
52Pucci, Forma, 176.
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followers to consume the bread and wine, without speculating on what was (or 
was not) taking place within.53
Finally Pucci noted that “It is also commonly taught, throughout all Chris-
tianity without any contradiction, that it is appropriate to dedicate every seventh 
day, that is Sunday, to sacred assemblies.” Respectful of this common teaching, 
Pucci proposed that his followers observe a simple albeit tightly controlled ser-
vice. When the members of the society gathered for worship, the oldest and most 
knowledgeable in scripture would, without any “ambition or vain ceremony,” 
take up a position in the assembly room where they could be heard by all. One 
of the elders would read some chapters of scripture to the assembled company. 
Pucci placed strict limits on what should be read publicly, advising that it was 
wise to avoid discussing any diicult passages in front of such a wide audience. 
he discussion of complex parts of the Bible, such as the prophetic works, should 
be restricted to those with the most experience of interpreting scripture. he 
elder who had read the passage aloud would then pray for divine inspiration 
before explaining its meaning. Ordinary members of the society would then be 
invited to discuss what had been said according to their consciences.54
Although Pucci had set out what he considered to be acceptable beliefs and 
practices, he remained aware that many others existed. He was also conscious 
of the fact that some of them were undoubtedly false and instituted by man. 
To avoid his citizens from jeopardizing their salvation, Pucci advised them to 
refrain from any uncertain practices. Conscious that some might continue to 
exercise a hold over his followers, he advocated a limited form of tolerance. Until 
a council could determine deinitively which practices were true and which false, 
he judged that all of “our citizens are free to govern themselves according to their 
conscience.” He also urged restraint on future members of his republic, by stating 
“that they should not condemn nor denounce one another for similar diferences, 
if in the rest they are devout and good men.”55
his passage certainly appears to suggest that Pucci advocated freedom of 
conscience in certain matters religious for the members of his society, but his 
ideas again difered from those of the humanist irenicists. None of the practices 
that Pucci suggested could be tolerated were strictly adiaphoral, for God either 
approved of them or he did not. With his ideas of freedom of conscience, Pucci 
sought only to protect the stability of his community, aiming to prevent it being 
disrupted by unnecessary internal doctrinal dispute. his he achieved by advocat-
ing a temporally limited doctrine of toleration, one that would allow his followers 
to engage in practices of which he did not necessarily approve. He arrived at his 
position partly through his skepticism. Pucci certainly did not approve of ideas 
and practices that he considered ungodly, but prior to a council, he considered it 
53Pucci, Forma, 176– 77; he discussed the sacraments and particularly baptism further (206– 8).
54Pucci, Forma, 177– 78.
55Pucci, Forma, 179.
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impossible to determine those that were categorically wrong. He was also led to 
this position by his theological conviction. he “tolerant” views that he expressed 
here were consistent with the ideas contained in his Lettera. Recall his argument 
that true belief will manifest itself in good works and correct behaviors. If an 
individual truly believed, it would follow that the decisions that he or she made 
in good conscience would be pleasing to God. Pucci accepted that some of his 
followers might not truly believe, and that such misbelief would manifest itself 
in the performance of corrupted practices. hough man could not know if any 
individual had ofended God, He would punish them if they had. Pucci was not 
withholding judgment on those of his followers who held wrong beliefs, but was 
instead deferring it to a higher authority.
It is also notable that although Pucci was prepared to grant a limited degree 
of freedom of conscience to members of his community, he did not extend it to 
the adherents of other confessions. In the third chapter of the Forma, he described 
how his citizens ought to conduct themselves in relation to the civil authorities. 
In this section, he described how the bishop of Rome and other similarly high- 
ranking ecclesiastics had usurped the place of God on earth, erecting what he 
termed “a superstitious sovereignty” in many Christian states. Having arrogated 
to themselves the power to interpret and dispense divine law, they acted to pre-
vent any free council or reformation that might challenge their power. hey had 
also forced many Christians to accept “non- catholic and superstitious things.”56 
Whereas maintaining a deep sympathy for the members of the laity inculcated 
with false beliefs, Pucci clearly regarded those beliefs to be abhorrent.
In this passage, Pucci also returned to one of his most important themes— 
the detrimental impact of the clerical order on Christian society. His anger at the 
fact that they taught “non- catholic” beliefs can be explained by returning once 
more to his comments concerning the signiicance of false instruction contained 
in the Lettera. By teaching the faithful erroneous doctrines, the priests were 
acting as false parents who beget ill- bred children. Growing up within commu-
nities in which these traditions were observed, individuals who might otherwise 
choose to live as good Christians were iguratively born as sinners. Placing their 
trust in their priests, they freely chose to give themselves over to false belief, and 
ultimately to damnation. Far from tolerating the teachings of other Christians 
with whom he disagreed, Pucci believed that it was imperative that they were 
shown to be false.
We are now in a position to understand Pucci’s inal ambition for his repub-
lic. He ofered Christians a means to escape the superstitions imposed by a cor-
rupt and self- serving clergy. Within his republic, like- minded Christians could 
live without fear that they might incur God’s wrath by practicing corrupted ver-
sions of the faith instituted by the clergy. Together they could break the cycle of 
parents begetting ill- born children. Observing their strictly limited faith, they 
56Pucci, Forma, 181.
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could await, and perhaps contribute to, the formation of the council that would 
establish Christian truth. Yet, although Pucci may have presented his republic 
as a haven from doctrinal dispute, it is notable that in order to derive any beneit 
from his society, it was necessary to subscribe to his theological principles. One 
needed to accept his assertion that simply having faith in God, and refraining 
from engaging in corrupted practices was enough to ensure salvation.
Conclusion
Pucci’s thought— whether on matters of soteriology or tolerance— was highly 
idiosyncratic, and consequently it is diicult to deine according to established 
historiographical categories. his does not mean that none are relevant. To the 
contrary, aspects of his thought readily could be classiied according to a number 
of existing categories. he problem is that none would fully capture the complex-
ity of his thought. A new category could be developed to describe his ideas, but it 
would likely only be useful to describe this speciic case. It may be more produc-
tive to conceptualize Pucci as someone who borrowed freely from a repertoire 
of contemporary ideas on toleration in order to develop solutions to the practi-
cal problem of Christian coexistence. An alternative approach to the intellectual 
history of toleration therefore may be to consider how individuals such as Pucci 
appropriated ideas and set them to use in the pursuit of speciic ends, rather 
than to consider how they contributed to an abstract debate over the nature of 
toleration.❧
